The End of External Sustainment: Why America’s Somalia Pivot Should Surprise No One
By Mark E. Kouri
The recent announcement that the United States intends to end its support for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) by the end of 2026 has generated considerable concern among diplomats, analysts, and security professionals. Some view the decision as a dangerous retreat from one of the world’s most fragile security environments. Others see it as an overdue correction to an international mission that has become increasingly dependent upon external financing.
Having spent nearly a decade training African Union peacekeeping forces and advising partner nations across Africa, I view the decision somewhat differently.
America’s pivot in Somalia should surprise no one.
For more than twenty years, the international community has invested enormous resources into stabilizing Somalia. Billions of dollars have been spent supporting peacekeeping operations, strengthening security forces, conducting counterterrorism operations, and sustaining government institutions. Yet despite notable successes, Somalia remains heavily dependent on external support for many of the functions necessary to maintain security and governance.
The fundamental question has never been whether foreign assistance would eventually end.
The real question has always been whether the capabilities being funded were ever truly transferred.
The Difference Between Capability and Capacity
From 2009 to 2017, I worked within the U.S. Department of State’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, training African Union battalions preparing for peace support operations across the continent. I served as Country Manager in Djibouti, Benin, and Burkina Faso and worked alongside military leaders and peacekeepers from numerous African nations.
During those years, I witnessed remarkable progress.
Units that initially struggled with basic staff planning evolved into competent organizations capable of conducting complex operations. Officers learned command and control procedures. Soldiers mastered peacekeeping tasks. Leadership structures matured. Professionalism increased dramatically.
These accomplishments were real and significant.
Yet there is an important distinction between creating operational capability and creating institutional capacity.
A battalion may be able to conduct operations effectively. A brigade may demonstrate tactical competence. A ministry may produce strategic plans. But if those organizations remain dependent upon external funding, foreign logistics, contracted maintenance, international transportation networks, or outside technical expertise, their long-term viability remains uncertain.
Capability can be trained.
Capacity must be built.
The difference matters.
Sustainment Is the Real Test
The least glamorous aspect of military development is often the most important.
Weapons systems attract attention. New vehicles generate headlines. Counterterrorism operations make news. Yet the true measure of institutional maturity is sustainment.
Can equipment be maintained without foreign contractors?
Can supply chains function without international funding?
Can personnel systems recruit, train, and retain qualified leaders?
Can governments budget for security requirements without external donors carrying the burden?
Can logistics systems support operations year after year?
These questions determine whether security gains endure or disappear.
Throughout Africa, I observed partner nations making impressive advances in operational capability. I also observed how difficult it was to establish sustainable systems capable of functioning independently over the long term.
Building military proficiency can take months.
Building self-sustaining institutions can take decades.
Somalia Is Not Unique
Much of the current debate surrounding Somalia assumes that the country’s challenges are exceptional.
They are not.
The same pattern has emerged repeatedly in conflict and post-conflict environments around the world.
Foreign assistance can provide security. It can create breathing room. It can buy time for political institutions to mature. It can prevent collapse.
What it cannot do is permanently substitute for domestic political consensus, accountable governance, or national ownership.
The United States learned this lesson in Afghanistan. European nations confronted similar realities in parts of the Sahel. International partners continue to wrestle with these challenges throughout the developing world.
Somalia represents another chapter in a familiar story.
Years of investment have produced important gains. Al-Shabaab has been contained in many areas. Somali security forces have improved. Regional cooperation has expanded.
Yet many of the underlying political and institutional challenges remain unresolved.
No amount of external funding can indefinitely compensate for that reality.
The Logic Behind Washington’s Decision
Many observers have interpreted the decision to end UNSOS support as a sign that Washington is disengaging from Somalia.
I believe that interpretation misses the larger point.
The United States is not abandoning Somalia.
Rather, it appears to be redefining its role.
The future model is likely to emphasize bilateral relationships, targeted security assistance, intelligence cooperation, counterterrorism partnerships, and limited strategic engagement rather than serving as the principal financial underwriter of a large multilateral stabilization mission.
This reflects broader changes in American foreign policy.
As strategic competition with China intensifies and fiscal pressures increase, policymakers are becoming increasingly skeptical of open-ended commitments whose costs continue to rise while outcomes remain uncertain.
Whether one agrees with that assessment or not, it represents a logical evolution in American strategic thinking.
The era of indefinite external sustainment was unlikely to continue forever.
A Test for African Institutions
The implications extend beyond Somalia.
The decision represents a broader test of African-led security architecture.
For years, the African Union and its international partners have emphasized concepts such as African solutions to African problems. Significant progress has been made toward that objective. African militaries today are more capable, professional, and experienced than at any point in modern history.
The question now is whether the institutions supporting those forces have matured sufficiently to absorb greater responsibility.
If they have, the transition may ultimately strengthen regional ownership and accountability.
If they have not, gaps will emerge quickly.
Subsidized capability often appears strong until the subsidy disappears.
Transferred capability endures.
That distinction may determine the future effectiveness of AUSSOM and the broader regional security framework.
The Future of the Horn
The Horn of Africa is entering a new era.
The United States remains engaged, but it is no longer willing to serve as the unquestioned financial guarantor of every aspect of regional stabilization. At the same time, new actors—including Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, China, and others—continue to expand their influence across the Red Sea corridor and East Africa.
The result will not be a vacuum.
It will be a more competitive geopolitical environment in which influence is measured less by who funds peacekeeping missions and more by who develops enduring partnerships, builds institutions, and shapes regional security architecture.
The future of Somalia will ultimately be determined not in Washington, Brussels, New York, or Addis Ababa, but by the choices made in Mogadishu and throughout the region.
For those of us who have spent years training, mentoring, and advising African partner forces, the lesson is straightforward.
Funding capability is important.
Building ownership is essential.
America’s Somalia pivot should not be viewed as the end of engagement. It should be viewed as the end of an assumption—that external sustainment can continue indefinitely.
Sooner or later, every partner nation must stand on its own institutions.
The true measure of success is whether those institutions are ready when that day arrives.